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When relationship-speciﬁc investments are necessary for produc-
tion, under-investment occurs if contracts cannot be enforced. The
eﬃciency loss from under-investment will diﬀer across industries de-
pending on the importance of relationship-speciﬁc investments in the
production process. As a consequence, a country’s contracting envi-
ronment may be an important determinant of comparative advantage.
To test for this, I construct measures of the eﬃciency of contract en-
forcement across countries and the importance of relationship-speciﬁc
investments across industries. I ﬁnd that countries with better contract
enforcement specialize in industries that rely heavily on relationship-
speciﬁc investments. This is true even after controlling for traditional
determinants of comparative advantage such as endowments of capital
and skilled labor.
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11 Introduction
What determines a country’s comparative advantage? Although this is one
of the oldest, most fundamental questions in international trade, we still
lack a full understanding of the primary determinants of comparative ad-
vantage and the resulting pattern of trade (Davis and Weinstein, 2001). In
this paper, I consider a previously untested determinant of comparative ad-
vantage: the quality of a country’s contracting environment. I test whether
a country’s ability to enforce written contracts is an important determinant
of its comparative advantage.
The channel that I consider builds on a well-established insight from
the theory of the ﬁrm: when investments are relationship-speciﬁc, under-
investment will occur if contracts cannot be enforced. An investment is
“relationship-speciﬁc” if its value within a buyer-seller relationship is signif-
icantly higher than outside the relationship. An example is an investment
made by an input supplier to customize an input for a ﬁnal good producer.
When customization requires investments that are relationship-speciﬁc, the
ﬁnal good producer can hold-up the supplier if contracts are imperfectly
enforced. After the relationship-speciﬁc investments have been made, the
buyer can renege on the initially agreed upon price and pay the supplier
the (signiﬁcantly lower) value of the investments outside of the relationship,
which is the lowest price the supplier will accept. The supplier, anticipat-
ing the ex post opportunistic behavior, will under-invest in the necessary
relationship-speciﬁc investments. The under-investment will raise the costs
of producing the intermediate inputs, as well as the costs of producing the
ﬁnal good that use the inputs. In countries with good contract enforce-
ment, there is less under-investment and the costs of production are lower
than in countries with poor contract enforcement. The more important
are relationship-speciﬁc investments in the production process, the greater
the cost advantages aﬀorded to good contracting countries relative to poor
contracting countries. In other words, countries with good contracting en-
vironments have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that
require relationship-speciﬁc investments.
I test for this relationship by examining whether countries with bet-
ter contracting environments export more in industries that use intensively
relationship-speciﬁc investments. As a measure of the quality of a country’s
contracting environment I use a variable called the ‘rule of law’ from Kauf-
mann et al. (2003), which measures the eﬀectiveness and predictability of
the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts. To quantify the importance
of relationship-speciﬁc investments across industries I construct a variable
2that measures, for each commodity, the proportion of its intermediate in-
puts that are relationship-speciﬁc. I use the United States input-output
(I-O) tables to determine which intermediate inputs are used in the pro-
duction of each ﬁnal good. I identify inputs that are relationship-speciﬁc
using data from Rauch (1999). I use whether or not an input is sold on an
organized exchange as one indicator of whether it is relationship-speciﬁc. If
an input is sold on an exchange, this indicates that the market for the input
is thick, with many alternative buyers. Therefore, the value of the input
outside of the relationship is close to the value inside the relationship, and
by deﬁnition the input is not relationship-speciﬁc. If a good is not sold on
an exchange, it may be reference priced in trade publications. This indicates
an intermediate level of market thickness and relationship-speciﬁcity. Using
this additional indicator, I construct a second measure of the proportion of
a good’s inputs that are relationship-speciﬁc. The measure is constructed
in the same manner as the ﬁrst measure, except that reference priced inputs
are also categorized as not being relationship-speciﬁc.
I test for the inﬂuence of contract enforcement on comparative advantage
by comparing how the export ratios of country pairs diﬀer across industries.
I ﬁnd that countries with good contract enforcement export more in in-
dustries that rely heavily on relationship-speciﬁc investments. In addition,
when I control for countries’ endowments of capital and skilled labor, I ﬁnd
that the contracting environment is able to explain as much of the variation
in trade ﬂows as capital and skilled labor combined.
To correct for the possibility of omitted variables bias, I include a num-
ber of determinants of comparative advantage that if omitted may bias my
results. I ﬁnd that the results remain after controlling for a wide range of
alternative determinants of comparative advantage. To estimate the causal
eﬀect of judicial quality on trade ﬂows, I use instrumental variables (IV).
As instruments I use each country’s legal origin. Because legal origin may
aﬀect comparative advantage through channels other than the quality of
a country’s contracting environment, I also pursue a second strategy. I
compare the relative exports of British common law and French civil law
countries, but restrict my comparison to pairs of countries that are matched
by important country characteristics that may aﬀect comparative advantage
and trade ﬂows. I match country pairs using per capita income, ﬁnancial
development, factor endowments and trade openness. I ﬁnd that the esti-
mated eﬀect of judicial quality on trade ﬂows continues to be statistically
signiﬁcant.
31.1 Related Literature
This paper is most related to the literature on the organization of the multi-
national ﬁrm.1 These studies also use the insight that the existence of
relationship-speciﬁc investments creates a potential for hold-up, but they
also exploit the additional insight, developed by Williamson (1975, 1985),
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), that integration
of the two parties is a possible solution to the help alleviate the hold-up
problem. The literature incorporates these insights into general equilibrium
trade models to understand the organization of multinational ﬁrms. One of
the ﬁrst papers in this literature is McLaren (2000), who models the eﬀect
that international openness can have on ﬁrm structure. In his model, in-
creased openness helps alleviate the hold-up problem and leads to a decrease
in vertical integration. Grossman and Helpman (2002) study the determi-
nants of ﬁrms’ make-or-buy decisions in a model where the organization of
the ﬁrm is endogenous. Subsequent studies have more explicitly modelled
the ﬁrm in an international environment, either looking at the ﬁrm’s make-
or-buy decision when inputs are obtained internationally (Grossman and
Helpman, 2003; Antr` as, 2003), the ﬁrm’s decision of whether to outsource
domestically or abroad (Grossman and Helpman, 2005), or the ﬁrm’s simul-
taneous choice of location and ownership structure (Antr` as and Helpman,
2004; Antr` as, 2005). Most recently, Ornelas and Turner (2005) consider the
eﬀects of trade liberalization on the organization of production by multina-
tional ﬁrms, and Puga and Treﬂer (2005) model how multinational ﬁrms’
innovation decisions are aﬀected by the quality of the contracting environ-
ment.
Although related, the focus of these papers is very diﬀerent from mine.
In all of these studies, the authors take comparative advantage as given and
focus on the eﬀect that the contracting environment has on the production
decisions of multinational ﬁrms. In this paper, I take a step back and con-
sider whether the contracting environment is also important for comparative
advantage. The focus of this paper is closely related to Acemoglu, Antr` as
and Helpman (2005) and Costinot (2005), who model the eﬀect that con-
tract enforcement has on comparative advantage and the resulting pattern
of trade. Both papers also develop models where comparative advantage
is determined by the contracting environment, but neither paper tests the
predictions of their models. The core contribution of this paper is test-
ing whether a country’s contracting environment is an important source of
comparative advantage.
1For comprehensive surveys of this literature see Spencer (2005) and Treﬂer (2005).
4The paper is related to studies that consider the relationship between
institutions and trade. A number of papers have found that a country’s in-
stitutional quality increases its volume of trade (Anderson, 2002; Berkowitz,
Moenius and Pistor, 2004; de Groot et al., 2004; Ranjan and Lee, 2004).
This paper is most closely related to Levchenko (2004), which is the ﬁrst
paper to test for the eﬀect that institutional quality has on comparative ad-
vantage, rather than trade volumes. Levchenko tests whether countries with
better institutions specialize in goods that are institutionally dependent,
proxied for by a product’s complexity. Levchenko measures the complexity
of a product by quantifying the variety of inputs used to produce the good.
The use of a wider range of inputs indicates that the good is more com-
plex. Levchenko ﬁnds that countries with better institutions export more in
industries that are institutionally dependent/complex.
Finally, the paper is related to two studies that focus on relationship-
speciﬁc investments and their ability to explain the importance of the keiretsu
system for production and trade in Japan’s auto industry. Spencer and Qiu
(2001) show how the increase in relationship-speciﬁc investments caused by
the vertical structure of the keiretsu system may act as a barrier to trade,
causing a fall in the range of imported auto parts. Head, Ries and Spencer
(2004) test for this eﬀect and ﬁnd that U.S. exports to Japan are reduced
for parts where keiretsu sourcing is most important.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I develop a model
that illustrates how diﬀerences in contract enforcement between countries
can determine comparative advantage and the resulting pattern of trade.
In Section 3, I describe the data and constructed variables. In Section
4, I use the model to develop my estimating equations and I report the
basic empirical results. In Section 5, I correct for endogeneity and omitted
variables bias, and test the robustness of my estimates. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
I develop a simple, stylized model that illustrates how contract enforcement
can aﬀect comparative advantage. I do not claim that the model is general.
Rather, it is meant to provide one example of how diﬀerences in contract
enforcement across countries can aﬀect comparative advantage and the re-
sulting pattern of trade.
I extend Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) by modelling the
source of countries’ Ricardian productivity diﬀerences as coming from dif-
ferences in their contracting environments. As in their model, I assume
5that there is a continuum of ﬁnal goods indexed by z ∈ [0,1]. Unlike the
original model, which assumes that the only factor of production is labor,
I assume that production requires intermediate inputs, some of which re-
quire relationship-speciﬁc investments. I call inputs that do not require
relationship-speciﬁc investments standardized inputs and those that do cus-
tomized inputs. Each unit of a ﬁnal good z requires one unit of a stan-
dardized input and a(z) units of a customized input, where a(z) > 0 and








where Xs(z) and Xc(z) denote the total usage of standardized inputs, s,
and customized inputs, c.2 Consumers’ preferences are identical and Cobb-
Douglas.
2.1 Customized Input Production
Production of customized inputs requires a principal and an agent. Each
principal is endowed with the knowledge of how to produce an input for a
speciﬁc ﬁnal good producer. Each principal hires an agent to produce the
inputs. Before production takes place, the principal and agent negotiate a
split of the surplus of the relationship. I denote the agent’s share of the
surplus by s and therefore 1 − s is the principal’s share.
When producing customized inputs the agent must choose the level of
customization, which is given by q ≥ 0. The surplus generated from inputs
with customization equal to q is given by f(q). I assume that the produc-
tivity of the input produced, and therefore the surplus of the relationship,
is increasing at a decreasing rate in customization: f′(q) > 0 and f′′(q) ≤ 0.
For simplicity, I assume that the production and customization of inputs
occurs at zero cost.
After the inputs have been produced by the agent, the principal can
attempt to renegotiate the contract. I assume that if successful, the principal
pays the agent the value of the input outside of the relationship, which I
assume for simplicity is zero.3 The only protection the agent has against
2The results of the model do not depend on the speciﬁc production function chosen. For
example, if a
c(z) units of the customized input and a
s(z) units of the standardized input
are required to produce one unit of the ﬁnal good, then all results of the model hold.
As well, one could allow for substitutability between inputs, modelling the production
function as Cobb-Douglas. Again, all results hold in this environment.
3The implicit assumption here is that the principal makes an oﬀer to the agent, which
6renegotiation is the judicial system. If the principal attempts to renegotiate
the contract, the agent can take the case to court. I assume that with
probability γ the judge is able to perfectly verify the surplus, and she rules
for the agent. With probability 1 − γ, the judge is unable to verify all
of the surplus. The probability γ is thus a measure of how well contracts
are enforced. I assume that when the surplus cannot be fully veriﬁed by
the judge, she is only able to observe a proportion of the surplus given by
0 < g(q) < 1. I assume that customization makes the surplus increasingly
diﬃcult to verify (g′(q) < 0) and that veriﬁability is decreasing at a constant
rate (g′′(q) = 0).4 The court is able to enforce the ex ante contract for the
proportion of the surplus that is veriﬁable. For the remainder the principal
renegotiates the price and is able to pay the agent zero.
To summarize, the timing of events is as follows.
1. Contract Negotiation: The principal and agent match. They negotiate
a split of the surplus, s.
2. Customization: The agent produces the input, choosing the amount
of customization to undertake, q.
3. Litigation and Renegotiation: With probability γ the judge is able to
perfectly observes the surplus and with probability 1 − γ the judge
imperfectly observes the surplus.
I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, working backwards from
period 3 to period 1.
2.1.1 Period 3: Litigation and Renegotiation
I assume that the cost of going to court is zero for both the principal and the
agent. If the court rules in favor of the agent, then the principal is forced
to uphold the contract and the principal does not face further penalty. If
the court rules in for the principal, the principal is free to renegotiate the
contract. Given these assumptions, in equilibrium, the principal always
breaks the contract and the agent always takes the principal to court.
the agent either accepts or rejects. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the principal oﬀers
to pay the agent zero for the input and the agent accepts the principal’s oﬀer.
4The assumption that g
′′(q) = 0 is much stricter than necessary. It is made to simplify
the exposition of the model. All of the results that follow hold as long as the second
derivative of g(q) is not too large. Speciﬁcally, all results hold as long as g





′′(q)], which is greater than zero.
72.1.2 Period 2: Customization
The agent’s payoﬀ is as follows. With probability γ, the contract is enforced
and the agent receives the fraction s of the surplus f(q)pc. That is, she
receives sf(q)pc. With probability 1 − γ, the courts can only verify the
proportion g(q) of the surplus, and the agent receives sf(q)pcg(q). Thus,
the agent’s expected payoﬀ is
πa(pc,γ,s,q) = sf(q)pc[γ + (1 − γ)g(q)] (1)
The agent chooses q to maximize πa(pc,γ,s,q). The agent’s optimal
level of customization, q∗, is given by
γ
1 − γ




The agent’s optimal level of customization is increasing in the quality of
judicial system: q∗′(γ) > 0. This can be seen as follows. The LHS of (2)
is decreasing in q. Because g′′(q) = 0 and f′′(q) ≤ 0, the RHS of (2) is
increasing in q. Therefore, an increase in γ increases the LHS of (2) and
increases q∗.
The principal’s payoﬀ is equal to f(q)pc minus the payoﬀ that the agent
receives. The principal’s payoﬀ can be written
πp(pc,γ,s,q∗) = f(q∗)pc[1 − γs − (1 − γ)g(q∗)s] (3)
where q∗ is given by (2).
2.1.3 Period 1: Contract Negotiation
The initial contract speciﬁes the share s of the surplus that the agent re-
ceives. I model the determination of s as the outcome of Nash bargaining.
If the principal and agent fail to come to an agreement, both receive zero.
Therefore, the Nash bargaining solution is given by
max
s
Π(s) = πa(pc,γ,s,q∗)   πp(pc,γ,s,q∗) (4)
Substituting (1) and (3) into (4) and maximizing with respect to s yields
s(γ,q∗) =
1
2[γ + (1 − γ)g(q∗)]
(5)
8For future use, I express the agent’s payoﬀ as a function of pc and γ only





where q∗(γ) is given by (2). I next consider the payoﬀ of agents that produce
standardized inputs.
2.2 Standardized Input Production
Production of standardized inputs occurs in the same manner as the pro-
duction of customized inputs, except that inputs are not made for a speciﬁc
ﬁnal good producer. Because of this, there is no possibility of the principal
holding-up the agent. I assume that each period, each agent can produce
one input and that the principal and agent split the value of the input ps
according to the Nash bargaining solution. Thus, the principal and agent’s
payoﬀs are equal and given by




I assume that agents are free to produce either type of input. Therefore,
in equilibrium agents must be indiﬀerent between producing customized and






Because q∗(γ) is increasing in γ and f( ) is an increasing function, the price
of customized inputs relative to standardized inputs pc/ps is decreasing in γ.
In countries with poor contract enforcement (low γ), the price of customized
inputs relative to standardized inputs is high. As I show in the next section,
diﬀerences in countries’ relative input prices aﬀect their relative costs of
producing in diﬀerent industries, which determines comparative advantage.
2.3 Final Goods Production and the Pattern of Trade
The cost of producing one unit of good z is equal to
c(ps,pc,z) = ps + pca(z)
Using (8) this can be rewritten
c(ps,γ,z) = ps[1 + a(z)/f(q∗(γ))]
9Consider the model with two countries. Denote the country with the
lower quality judicial system by a prime so that γ > γ′, and c(ps,γ,z) and
c(ps′
,γ′,z) are the unit costs in the two countries. As the following lemma
establishes, the unit cost of the country with the better judicial system
relative to the unit cost of the country with the worse judicial system is
decreasing in z. In other words, the country with the better judicial system
has a comparative advantage in contract-intensive industries. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
Lemma. The ratio c(ps,γ,z)/c(ps′
,γ′,z) is decreasing in z.
The lemma can be seen from Figure 1, which displays unit costs as a
function of z for both countries.5 Both unit cost curves are upward sloping
because as z increases more units of the customized input are required in
production. Because the cost of producing customized inputs relative to
standardized inputs is higher in the poor contracting environment country,
as one increases z the unit cost of the poor contracting country increases
faster than the unit cost of the good contracting country. As a result, as
stated in the lemma, the unit cost of the good contracting country relative
to the poor contracting country is decreasing in z.
1 0
c(z)




Figure 1: The pattern of trade with two countries.
The ﬁgure also illustrates the model’s equilibrium when there is free
trade. In equilibrium, the cost of producing some good, denoted ˜ z, is equal
5The cost curves are not restricted to be linear as drawn in the graph. This will only
occur if a
′(z) is constant.
10in both countries. Because goods produced in either countries are perfect
substitutes and because transportation costs are zero, the country with the
lower cost of producing a good will produce the good for both the domestic
and foreign markets. Therefore, in equilibrium z < ˜ z goods are exported
by the poor judiciary country and z > ˜ z goods are exported by the good
judiciary country.
An equilibrium is deﬁned as values of ps/ps′
and ˜ z that satisfy two condi-
tions: balanced trade and equal costs of producing good ˜ z in each country.
The following proposition states that for any two countries with diﬀerent
levels of judicial quality, there exists an unique equilibrium with trade.
Proposition. For any two countries with γ  = γ′ an equilibrium with trade
exists and is unique.
Conceptually, equilibrium is determined as follows. Because the slope
of each country’s cost curve is determined by γ and a(z), changes in ps/ps′
shift the countries’ cost curves vertically relative to each other. This adjusts
˜ z and the range of goods produced by each country until trade is balanced
in both countries.




Figure 2: The pattern of trade with three countries.
When there are more than two countries, in equilibrium each country
specializes in an interval of goods. Because a(z) is the same for all countries,
diﬀerences in γ between countries result in diﬀerences in the slope of their
cost curves. The lower is a country’s γ, the steeper is the slope of the
11country’s cost curve. Diﬀerences in the slopes of countries’ cost curves ensure
that each country specializes in an interval of goods. If a country’s cost curve
does not lie below all other countries’ cost curves over some range of z, then
the price of inputs in that country ps will decrease until the country becomes
the lowest cost producer over some interval of goods. In equilibrium, the
decrease in the price will ensure that the country’s balanced trade condition
is satisﬁed. Figure 2 shows an equilibrium with three countries. The country
with the lowest γ specializes in the segment of the lowest z goods, [0, ˜ z1].
The country with the intermediate level of γ specializes in the middle range
of z goods, [˜ z1, ˜ z2]. The high γ country specializes in the highest z goods,
[˜ z2,1]. The equilibrium with a general number of countries is described in
the Appendix.
The model yields the stark prediction that in equilibrium goods are
produced by only one country. This result follows from the assumption,
originally made by Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), that goods
produced in diﬀerent countries are perfect substitutes. As Romalis (2004)
shows, one can extend Dornbusch, Fishcher and Samuelson’s model by as-
suming that countries produce diﬀerent varieties of the same good and that
the varieties are imperfect substitutes. This assumption along with trans-
portation costs yields the prediction that all countries produce all goods,
but countries with lower costs capture a larger share of the world market.
What I take as most important from the model developed here is not its
stark prediction about trade ﬂows, but its prediction of how countries’ rel-
ative costs change over z depending on their values of γ. In Section 4, I
use these predictions to derive my estimating equations. Before doing this,
I ﬁrst describe the data that I use.
3 The Data
To test for contract enforcement as a source of comparative advantage I need
measures for at least three variables: the volume of goods traded by each
country in each industry, the quality of the contracting environment in each
country (γ in the model), and the contract intensity of each industry (z in
the model). I consider each measure below. All other variables used in the
analysis are described in the Appendix.
I use trade data from 1997 taken from Feenstra (2000). I convert the
original trade data, which are classiﬁed by 4-digit SITC codes, to the BEA’s
1997 I-O industry classiﬁcation. In the end, the trade data are classiﬁed into
222 industries. Full details of the conversion are provided in the Appendix.
12As my primary measure of the quality of a country’s contracting envi-
ronment, I use a measure from Kaufmann et al. (2003) called the ‘rule of
law’, which is a weighted average of a number of variables that measure in-
dividual’s perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary
and the enforcement of contracts in each country in 1997-1998. A list of
the countries in the analysis ordered by rule of law is provided in Table 11.
Although other measures of judicial quality exist, I have chosen Kaufmann
et al.’s variable as my baseline measure because it is available for the largest
number of countries.6 In Section 5.3, I test the sensitivity of my results to
the use of alternative measures of judicial quality taken from Gwartney and
Lawson (2003) and Djankov et al. (2003). As I show, the results of the paper
are robust to the use of these other measures.
3.1 Constructing Measures of Relationship-Speciﬁcity: zi
The ﬁnal variable needed to test the model is a measure of the impor-
tance of relationship-speciﬁc investments across industries. I construct a
variable that directly measures the relationship-speciﬁcity of intermediate
inputs used in the production process. I use the 1997 United States I-O Use
Table to identify which intermediate inputs are used, and in what propor-
tions, in the production of each ﬁnal good.
Using data from Rauch (1999), I identify which inputs require relationship-
speciﬁc investments. As an indicator of whether an intermediate input is
relationship-speciﬁc, I use whether or not it is sold on an organized exchange
and whether or not it is reference priced in a trade publication. If an input
is sold on an organized exchange then the market for this good is thick, with
many alternative buyers. If many buyers for an input exist, then the scope
for hold-up is limited. If a buyer attempts to renegotiate a lower price, then
the seller can simply take the input and sell it to another buyer.7
If a good is not sold on an exchange, it may be reference priced in trade
publications. Because trade publications will only be printed if there are a
suﬃcient number of purchasers, the existent of a trade publication indicates
6Of the 159 countries with trade data, Kaufmann et al. (2003) have data for 146 of
them, while Gwartney and Lawson (2003) and Djankov et al. (2003) only have data for
112 and 116 of the countries.
7The setting that I describe is one where the seller must make relationship-speciﬁc
investments. However, in many situations it is the buyer that must make relationship-
speciﬁc investments. Whether an input is bought and sold on an exchange is still a good
indicator of the relationship-speciﬁcity of an input in these situations. This is because
inputs bought and sold on an exchange have many alternative sellers, and therefore the
seller’s ability to hold-up the buyer is limited.
13that multiple buyers exist, even though the market for this product is not
thick enough for it to be bought and sold on an exchange. Therefore, goods
not sold on an exchange but referenced in trade publications can be thought
of as having an intermediate level of relationship-speciﬁcity.
Rauch’s original classiﬁcation groups goods by the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2
system.8 In Rauch’s original data each industry is coded as being in one of
the following three categories: bought and sold on an exchange, reference
priced, or neither. I aggregate the indicators to the BEA’s I-O industry
classiﬁcation system by ﬁrst converting the 4-digit SITC to HS10 and HS10
to the I-O industry classiﬁcation. I use the number of HS10 categories linking
each SITC industry to each I-O industry as weights when aggregating. After
aggregation, I have measures of the proportion of inputs in each I-O category
that are bought and sold on an exchange, reference priced, or neither. Using
this information, along with information from the United States Use Table
on which inputs are used in the production of each ﬁnal good, I construct



















where θij ≡ uij/ui and uij is the value of input j used to produce goods in
industry i and ui is the total value of all inputs used in industry i; Rneither
j
is the proportion of inputs j that are neither sold on an organized exchange
nor reference priced; and R
ref price
j is the proportion of inputs j that are not
sold on an organized exchange but are reference priced. I denote the two
measures of zi by rs1 and rs2, where ‘rs’ stands for ‘relationship-speciﬁc’.
Both measures classify inputs that are neither bought and sold on an ex-
change nor reference priced as being relationship-speciﬁc, but the second
measure also includes reference priced inputs as being relationship-speciﬁc.
A list of the twenty least and twenty most contract intense industries
using zrs1
i is provided in Table 1. The ranking of industries appears sensi-
ble. For example, the least relationship-speciﬁc investment intense industry
is poultry processing. The primary input in this industry is chickens, which
are not relationship-speciﬁc because the market for chickens is thick. Other
8Rauch has both a liberal estimate and a conservative estimate. Throughout the paper,
I use the liberal estimate. None of the results of the paper are aﬀected by this decision.
14Table 1: The least and most contract intense industries.
20 Least Contract Intense: lowest z
rs1





i Industry Description z
rs1
i Industry Description
.023 Poultry processing .801 Electromedical apparatus manuf.
.024 Flour milling .801 Analytical laboratory instr. manuf.
.034 Petroleum reﬁneries .818 Air & gas compressor manuf.
.035 Wet corn milling .819 Other electronic component manuf.
.050 Nitrogenous fertilizer manufacturing .825 Other engine equipment manuf.
.053 Aluminum sheet, plate, & foil manuf. .832 Packaging machinery manuf.
.056 Fiber, yarn, & thread mills .839 Book publishers
.057 Primary aluminum production .850 Breweries
.096 Rice milling .854 Musical instrument manufacturing
.101 Coﬀee & tea manufacturing .857 Electricity & signal testing instr.
.112 Prim. nonferrous metal, ex. copper & alum. .875 Telephone apparatus manufacturing
.132 Tobacco stemming & redrying .875 Aircraft engine & engine parts manuf.
.144 Other oilseed processing .885 Search, detection, & navig. instr.
.150 Noncellulosic organic ﬁber manufacturing .889 Broadcast & wireless comm. equip.
.150 Plastics packaging materials .890 Aircraft manufacturing
.153 Nonwoven fabric mills .894 Audio & video equipment manuf.
.157 Phosphatic fertilizer manufacturing .895 Other computer peripheral equip. manuf.
.161 Resilient ﬂoor covering manufacturing .956 Electronic computer manufacturing
.167 Carpet & rug mills .974 Heavy duty truck manufacturing
.167 Synthetic dye & pigment manufacturing .979 Automobile & light truck manuf.
Notes: The measures have been rounded from seven digits to three digits.
industries among the 20 least contract intensive industries have primary in-
puts that are widely bought and sold; for example, ﬂour milling, petroleum
reﬁneries and oilseed processing. The industries listed as the most contract
intense industries also seem sensible. The most contract intense industries
listed are for various automobile, aircraft, computer, and electronic equip-
ment manufacturing industries, all of which intensively use inputs requiring
relationship-speciﬁc investments (see Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Masten,
Meehan and Snyder, 1989; Masten, 1984).
4 Estimating Equation and Basic Results
The model developed in Section 2 is a Ricardian model where diﬀerences in
production eﬃciencies arises because of diﬀerences in countries’ contracting
environments. Standard tests of Ricardian models take two countries and
compare how their relative export volumes vary across industries. Tests of
this nature have their origins with MacDougall (1951), Stern (1962) and
15Balassa (1963), and have most recently been performed by Golub and Hsieh
(2000). MacDougall compared exports from the United States and Britain
in 1937. He found that across industries the ratio of U.S. exports relative
to U.K. exports was positively correlated with the ratio of U.S. to U.K.
labor productivity. That is, relative to the U.K., the U.S. exported more in
industries where production was relatively more eﬃcient.
I generalize these tests by comparing the relative export ratios of all pos-
sible country pairs from my sample. I test whether good judiciary countries
have relatively higher exports of goods requiring greater relationship-speciﬁc
investments. As the ﬁrst step in deriving my baseline estimating equation,
I begin by considering the following model, which follows the same logic as






= αcc′ + β1zi + εicc′ (9)
where xic is total exports in industry i from country c to all other countries,
zi is the contract intensity of industry i, c denotes the country of the pair
with the better legal system, c′ denotes the country with the worse legal
system, and αcc′ denotes country pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
Conceptually, I would like to compare every country pair using the 146
countries in my data set. However, including every country pair in a re-
gression would involve a large amount of double counting. For example,
once I compare the export ratios of Japan to Taiwan and Japan to Korea,
then I have implicitly compared Taiwan to Korea. The observations of the
third regression equation can be calculated from the observations of the ﬁrst
two regression equations so there is a linear dependence across observations.
Ultimately, there are only 145 linearly independent country pairs. Because
of this, I compare each country relative to the United States.9 Because
there are 145 countries (not including the United States) and 222 indus-
tries, the number of possible observations is 145 × 222 = 32,190. However,
an observation is only included in the regression if both countries export
a non-zero amount in that industry. The number of actual observations in
each regression is 22,353.10
9An alternative strategy is to estimate a regression that includes every possible country
pair, but to make the necessary adjustment to the standard errors. Doing this yields nearly
identical results.
10Because I am only considering positive exports, the question that I am considering
in my analysis is: conditional on a country exporting in an industry, how do diﬀerences
in the contracting environment aﬀect the volume of exports in that industry? The eﬀect
that the quality of a country’s contracting environment has on its decision of whether or
not to enter an industry is not captured in my estimates.







Contract intensity: zi .11 .01
(5.96) (1.07)
Judicial quality .18 .18
interaction: zi(γc − γc′) (19.7) (21.9)
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes
R
2 .76 .77 .82
Number obs. 22,353 22,353 22,353
Notes: Beta coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets.
The contract intensity measure used is zrs1
i . Standard errors in
column 1 are adjusted for clustering within industries.
The model predicts that in (9), β1 should be positive; across industries,
the ratio of exports in the good judiciary country relative to those in the poor
judiciary country should increase as one moves from the least contract in-
tense industry to the most contract intense industry. The estimation results
of (9) are reported in column 1 of Table 2. Consistent with the prediction
of the model, the coeﬃcient of zi is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
In the model, the diﬀerence in the slopes of the cost functions increase
the greater is the diﬀerence between γ and γ′. This can be seen in Figure
1. Holding constant γ, the more one decreases γ′, the steeper is c(z) and
the greater the cost diﬀerences of the two curves as one moves along z. In
equilibrium, ps/ps′
will adjust, shifting the cost curves vertically relative to
one another to ensure that trade is balanced, but as one moves away from ˜ z
the diﬀerence in costs between the two countries is greater. This can also be
seen in the multi-country version of the model shown in Figure 2. Compare
the cost curves of country γh to γm, and country γh to γl. It is apparent
that the cost diﬀerences of countries γh and γm vary more than the cost
diﬀerences of countries γh and γm as one moves along z. Because countries
with more dissimilar judicial qualities have costs that diﬀer more over z,
it is expected that exports will also vary more over z the more dissimilar
the judicial qualities of the countries being compared. To capture this, I
also include an interaction between the diﬀerence in judicial quality and the







= αcc′ + β1zi + β2 zi(γc − γc′) + εicc′ (10)
Because γc is greater than γc′, β2 is expected to be positive: the greater
the diﬀerence in judicial quality between the two countries, the greater their
cost diﬀerences and the more cross-industry diﬀerences in contract intensity
inﬂuence the pattern of exports. When the interaction is included in the
estimating equation, β1 is expected to be zero. To see this consider the case
of two countries with the same quality judicial systems. Because γc = γc′, the
interaction term is equal to zero and the expected variation in the export
ratio across industries is equal to β1zi. Because the two countries have
identical cost curves, the pattern of trade should be unrelated to zi, with
β1 equal to zero. The estimation results, reported in column 2 of Table 2,
support the model’s predictions. The coeﬃcient for the interaction term
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient for zi is not
statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Because the predicted coeﬃcient for zi is zero when the interaction term
is included in the regression equation, in my baseline speciﬁcation, instead
of zi, I include industry ﬁxed eﬀects, which capture the potential inﬂuence







= αcc′ + αi + β zi(γc − γc′) + εicc′ (11)
Estimates of (11) are reported in column 3 of Table 2. The estimated coef-
ﬁcient for the interaction term remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
In addition to being statistically signiﬁcant, the estimated eﬀect of ju-
dicial quality on trade ﬂows is also economically signiﬁcant. The estimated
coeﬃcient in column 3 implies that if Thailand could improve its contract
enforcement to equal Taiwan’s, then its exports of “electronic computer
manufacturing” commodities would increase from 2.8 to 8.1 billion U.S. dol-
lars per year. Thailand’s share of world production in these commodities
would increase from 1.6 to 4.6%.11
11This is calculated as follows. Thailand’s γ is .580 and Taiwan’s is .734. Electronic
computer manufacturing’s zi is .956. Thailand’s value of exports in the industry is
2,830,776, measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. The beta coeﬃcient of .18 for β1
corresponds to a coeﬃcient of 7.17. If Thailand’s γ were improved to equal Taiwan’s,
then its exports of electronic computer manufacturing (call this xic) would be given by:
ln(xic) = ln(2,830,776) + β1zi∆γc = ln(2,830,776) + 7.17 · .956 · (.734 − .580). Solv-
ing yields xic = 8,121,293 or 8.1 billion U.S. dollars. Because total world production of
electronic computer manufacturing is 176 billion U.S. dollars, this represents and increase
from 1.6 to 4.6% of global exports.
18An alternative model to (11) that captures the same logic is: xic =
αi + αc + ziγc + εic. The functional form of this estimating equation is the
same as that used by Romalis (2004), when estimating the eﬀects that coun-
tries’ endowments of skill, capital and natural resources have on comparative
advantage. Romalis estimates his equations using a Tobit model and he is,
therefore, able to include zero export observations in his analysis. Using the
same methodology with my data produces essentially identical results to
what I report here. I prefer to use my estimating equation for two reasons.
First, as I have shown, its is derived from the model developed in Section
2 and from past tests of Ricardian models. Second, as I show in Section
5.1.3, because of the functional form of my estimating equation, I am able
to use propensity score matching techniques to correct for endogeneity and
omitted variables bias. I would not be able to use these techniques if I used
the same functional form as Romalis (2004).
4.1 The Role of Endowments
I control for standard factor endowment based determinants of comparative
advantage, such as countries’ stocks of capital and skilled labor. I do this by
including country pair diﬀerences in endowments of capital and skilled labor
interacted with the factor’s intensity of production in each industry. These
factor endowment interactions are given by hi(Hc − Hc′) and ki(Kc − Kc′),
where Hc and Kc are country c’s endowment of skilled labor and capital, and
hi and ki are the skill and capital intensity of production industry i. The
interactions test whether countries abundant in a particular factor export
relatively more in industries that use the factor intensively. Endowments
based models of comparative advantage predict a positive coeﬃcient for
the factor endowment interactions (see for example Dornbusch, Fischer and
Samuelson, 1980; Romalis, 2004).
Data on factor endowments and production intensities are more limited
than data on judicial quality and contract intensity. Factor endowment data
are only available for 70 countries and factor intensity data are only available
for 182 industries, resulting in a maximum of 69×182 = 12,558 observations.
Because of zero export values, the actual number of observations in each
regression is 10,792.
The results after controlling for factor endowments are reported in Ta-
ble 3. In column 1, I re-estimate (11) using the smaller sample of countries
and industries for which factor endowment and production intensity data
exist. As shown, even within the smaller sample, judicial quality remains an
important determinant of the pattern of trade. In column 2, I estimate the







Judicial quality interaction: zi(γc − γc′) .22 .21
(20.7) (17.7)
Skill interaction: hi(Hc − Hc′) .19 .12
(14.7) (9.21)
Capital interaction: ki(Kc − Kc′) .01 .09
(.90) (5.56)
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .84 .83 .84
Number obs. 10,792 10,792 10,792
Notes: Beta coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets. The measure
of contract intensity used is zrs1
i .
model without the judicial quality interaction, but with capital and skill in-
teractions. The results are roughly consistent with factor endowment based
models of comparative advantage. The coeﬃcients on both of the variables
are positive as expected, although the coeﬃcient for the capital interaction
is not statistically signiﬁcant. In column 3, I include both the factor endow-
ment interactions and the judicial quality interaction together. The judicial
quality interaction remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The esti-
mated coeﬃcient for the skill interaction decreases signiﬁcantly, but remains
statistically signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient for the capital interaction in-
creases signiﬁcantly and becomes signiﬁcant.
The relative magnitudes of the estimated coeﬃcients suggest that the
eﬀect of judicial quality on specialization is approximately the same magni-
tude as the combined eﬀects of capital and skilled labor. From the estimates
of column 3, a one standard deviation increase in the judicial quality inter-
action, increases the dependent variable by .21 standard deviations, while
a simultaneous one standard deviation increase in the capital and skilled
labor interactions also increases the dependent variable by .21 standard de-
viations.12
12One may be concerned that the importance of judicial quality relative to skill and
capital endowments is a result of my estimated skill and capital coeﬃcients being unusually
low. However, the estimated magnitudes of these coeﬃcients are similar to what other
20Overall, the results to this point provide preliminary evidence that sup-
port the prediction of the model that countries with better judicial systems
specialize in goods that are contract-intensive. In the remainder of the paper
I test the validity of these preliminary results by considering the econometric
issues surrounding the OLS estimates reported to this point. In Section 5.1,
I correct for the possibility of endogeneity and omitted variables bias in my
estimates. In Section 5.2, I deal with the bias introduced by the existence
of vertical integration and informal contract enforcement. Last, in Section
5.3, I perform a number of robustness and sensitivity checks.
5 Econometric Issues
5.1 Endogeneity and Omitted Variables Bias
There are a number of reasons why one cannot take the results presented
thus far as conclusive evidence of the eﬀect of contract enforcement on trade
ﬂows. One reason is that there may be determinants of trade ﬂows that have






= αcc′ + αi + βzi(γc − γc′) + δqi(Qc − Qc′) + εicc′ (12)
where Qc is an additional determinant of comparative advantage, causing
countries to specialize in certain industries according to qi. If zi and qi
or γc and Qc are correlated, then OLS estimates of (11) will be biased. I
correct for this possibility by controlling for a number of potential deter-
minants of comparative advantage and trade ﬂows. A second reason to be
skeptical of the OLS estimates is that causality may run from trade ﬂows
to judicial quality. Countries that have exports focused in high contract
intense industries may have a greater incentive to develop and maintain a
good contracting environment. Therefore, part of the correlation between
judicial quality and trade ﬂows may be from the eﬀect of trade ﬂows on
judicial quality. To estimate the causal inﬂuence of judicial quality on trade
ﬂows I estimate (11) using instrumental variables (IV). I use diﬀerences in
countries’ legal origins as instruments. Although a country’s legal origin
can be used to isolate exogenous variation in countries’ legal quality, it may
aﬀect comparative advantage through channels other than the quality of a
studies have found. For example, Levchenko (2004) estimates a speciﬁcation similar to
my baseline equation with skill and capital factor endowment interactions included. The
beta coeﬃcients for his skill and capital interactions are .10 and .12, both of which are of
the same magnitude as my estimate (see column 2 of Table 1).
21country’s contracting environment. Therefore, it may not satisfy the exclu-
sion restrictions necessary in order for the instruments to be valid. Because
of this, I pursue a second strategy. I compare the relative exports of British
common law and French civil law countries, but restrict my comparison to
pairs of countries that are matched by important country characteristics
that may aﬀect comparative advantage. I describe each of the procedures
in detail below.
5.1.1 Controlling for Additional Determinants of Trade
I control for a number of alternative determinants of comparative advantage
that may bias my results if omitted. The results of this are summarized in
Table 4. In the ﬁrst column, I include an interaction of the natural log
of income and value added as a fraction of the total value of shipments in
each industry in the United States.13 The interaction allows for the pos-
sibility that high income countries specialize in high value added goods.
Including this interaction changes the coeﬃcient of the judicial quality in-
teraction very little. In the second column, I interact log income with a
measure of the amount of intra-industry trade in each industry, measured
using the Grubel-Lloyd index for each industry. My results may be biased
because high income countries tend to focus trade in these industries. The
estimated coeﬃcient for this interaction is large and statistically signiﬁcant,
but the estimated coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance of the judicial quality interac-
tion changes little. In the third column, I control for the possibility that high
income countries may have a comparative advantage in dynamic industries
where technological progress is particularly rapid. I interact log income with
each industry’s total factor productivity growth between 1977 and 1997 in
the United States. Again, the results remain robust to the inclusion of this
variable. Next, I control for the possibility that countries that have better
developed ﬁnancial systems may have a comparative advantage in industries
that require a large amount of external ﬁnancing. I include an interaction
between the log of each country’s ratio of private credit to GDP and the
capital intensity of each industry. Again, the judicial quality interaction
coeﬃcient remains robust to the inclusion of this variable.14
13The Appendix provides a full description of the data source and method of construc-
tion of the variables reported in the Table 4.
14I have also tested the robustness of my results using diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial
development. I have used private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions to GDP, stock market capitalization to GDP, and stock market total value
traded to GDP. The results are robust to the use of each of these alternative measures.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Judicial quality interaction: zi(γc − γc′) .18 .18 .17 .18 .21 .16 .19 .20
(21.9) (19.6) (20.6) (20.5) (20.8) (18.4) (18.8) (16.3)
Log income, value added: vai(yc − yc′) .01 −.05 −.06
(.61) (−3.00) (−2.92)
Log income, intra-industry trade: iiti(yc − yc′) .20 .21 .21
(21.8) (20.3) (16.6)
Log income, TFP growth: ∆tfpi(yc − yc′) .00 −.00 −.01
(.23) (−.42) (−2.47)
Log Credit/GDP, capital: ki(crc − crc′) .04 .02 .02
(4.63) (2.75) (2.05)
Log income, input variety: (1 − HI i)(yc − yc′) .34 .18 .18
(11.5) (4.31) (3.41)
Factor endowment interactions No No No No No No No Yes
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .82 .84 .82 .84 .84 .82 .85 .84
Number obs. 22,353 17,966 21,526 17,966 15,864 21,526 15,542 10,632
Notes: Beta coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets. The measure of contract intensity used is zrs1
i .
2
3The ﬁnal variable that I include is motivated by the work of Clague
(1991a, 1991b), Blanchard and Kremer (1997), and Levchenko (2004). I in-
clude an interaction between log income and one minus the Herﬁndahl index
of input concentration in each industry. A small Herﬁndahl index indicates
that an industry uses a wide variety of inputs. Therefore, one minus the
Herﬁndahl index will be larger the wider the range of inputs that are used.
The interpretation of what one minus the Herﬁndahl index measures diﬀers
slightly in the diﬀerent studies. Clague (1991a, 1991b) views the variable as
a measure of how ‘self contained’ the industry is. He argues that because
developing countries have poorly developed transportation, communication
and distribution infrastructures, they will specialize in production that is
‘self contained’. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Levchenko (2004) inter-
pret the variable as measuring a good’s ‘complexity’. Because complex goods
rely more heavily on institutions than simple goods, high income countries,
with superior institutions, should specialize in these more complex goods.
Both interpretations of the measure predict a positive coeﬃcient for the in-
teraction term. High income countries should specialize in industries that
use a wide variety of inputs. As reported in column 6, this is found in
the data. As well, the coeﬃcient of the judicial quality interaction remains
robust to the inclusion of this variable.
In column 7, I include all control variables simultaneously. In column 8,
I also add the skill and capital interactions. In both cases, the coeﬃcient of
interest remains positive and signiﬁcant.
5.1.2 IV Estimates
To isolate the causal impact of judicial quality on trade patterns I use in-
strumental variables (IV). I use indicators of the legal origin of each country
to construct interaction variables, which I use to instrument my judicial
quality interaction. More precisely, I construct the following instruments:
zi(Bc − Bc′), zi(Fc − Fc′), zi(Gc − Gc′), zi(Sc − Sc′), where Bc, Fc, Gc and
Sc are indicator variables that equal one if country c has a legal origin that
is British common law, French civil law, German civil law and Socialist.
The omitted category is for Scandinavian civil law countries. Because each
country’s legal origin is predetermined and unaﬀected by trade ﬂows in 1997,
this can be used to isolate exogenous variation in judicial quality. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2004), Djankov et al. (2003) and Lerner and Schoar (2005)
have shown that legal origin is an important determinant of diﬀerences in
judicial quality and contract enforcement between countries. Their ﬁndings,
consistent with the work of legal historians, show that the quality of the
24judicial system is higher in British common law countries than in French
civil law countries, and that German and Scandinavian civil law countries
are found to lie between the French and British legal systems.
The IV estimates are reported in Table 5. The ﬁrst stage is summa-
rized in the bottom panel of the table. The coeﬃcient for the interaction
terms are statistically signiﬁcantly and the F-statistics are high. The signs
of the coeﬃcients are as expected. The signs and magnitudes of the co-
eﬃcients suggest that British legal origin countries have the best rule of
law, followed in order by German, French, Scandinavian and Socialist. The
second stage is summarized in the top panel of the table. In columns 1
and 3, I report the OLS results with and without factor endowment inter-
actions included in the regression equation. In columns 2 and 4, I report
the corresponding IV estimates. In both speciﬁcations, the IV coeﬃcients
are larger than the OLS estimates and are statistically signiﬁcant. The
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of consistency of OLS for both
speciﬁcations, suggesting that judicial quality is endogenous. The results
from tests of the over-identiﬁcation restrictions are mixed. Without factor
endowment interactions, the Chi-Squared test statistic is 13.7 and the null
hypothesis of valid instruments can be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level,
but with factor endowment interactions, the test statistic is 3.34 and the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at any standard signiﬁcance level. This
shows that unless factor endowment interactions are included in the second
stage, the instruments are correlated with the second stage error term. This
result may be explained by La Porta et al.’s (1998) ﬁnding that legal origin
aﬀects investor protection. If a country’s investor protection aﬀects its ac-
cumulation of physical and human capital, then legal origin will aﬀect trade
ﬂows through factor accumulation. Therefore, if factor endowments are not
controlled for, legal origin may have an eﬀect on trade ﬂows through factor
endowments. But once endowments are controlled for, legal origin does not
appear to have any additional eﬀect on trade ﬂows.
5.1.3 Matching Estimates
Although I control for factor endowments in the second stage of the IV
procedure, it is still possible that the instruments are correlated with the
second stage residuals. This is especially a concern because the IV estimates
of the eﬀect of judicial quality on trade ﬂows are larger than the OLS esti-
mates. Given the nature of the potential reverse causality, the IV estimates
are expected to be smaller than the OLS estimates, not larger. In addition,
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) ﬁnd that
25Table 5: IV estimates using legal origin as an instrument.
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Judicial quality interaction: zi(γc − γc′) .18 .25 .21 .46
(21.9) (14.6) (17.7) (13.7)
Skill interaction: hi(Hc − Hc′) .12 .04
(9.21) (2.46)
Capital interaction: ki(Kc − Kc′) .09 .19
(5.56) (9.02)
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .82 .82 .84 .83
Number obs. 22,353 22,353 10,792 10,792




First Stage: Dep var is zi(γc − γc′)
British interaction: zi(Bc − Bc′) .18 .13
(34.0) (22.2)
French interaction: zi(Fc − Fc′) .06 .05
(9.54) (6.93)
German interaction: zi(Gc − Gc′) .17 .12
(23.6) (14.9)





Notes: For the second stage, beta coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets.
For the ﬁrst stage, because the variables are indicator variables, I report regular
coeﬃcients. The omitted legal origin category in the ﬁrst stage is Scandinavian. The
measure of contract intensity used is zrs1
i . Because factor endowment data are not
available for any of the Socialist countries, the Socialist interaction term is not available
as an instrument when factor endowments are controlled for in the second stage.
26a country’s legal origin also aﬀects its ﬁnancial development. If ﬁnancial
development aﬀects trade through channels other than capital accumula-
tion, then the exclusion restrictions may be violated and the IV estimates
will be inconsistent. As well, Mahoney (2001) ﬁnds that legal origin aﬀects
economic growth. If a country’s level of development aﬀects its pattern of
trade, the IV estimates will be inconsistent.
To correct for this possibility, I pursue the following strategy. I con-
tinue to use diﬀerences in legal origin as a measure of diﬀerences in judicial
quality that are unaﬀected by trade ﬂows in 1997, but I restrict my analy-







= αbf + βzi + εibf (13)
where xib and xif denotes total exports from a British and French legal
origin country in industry i. Because, all else equal, British common law
countries tend to have better legal systems than French civil law countries,
β is expected to be positive.
Because British common law and French civil law countries are diﬀer-
ent in many ways other than the quality of their judicial systems, I restrict
my comparison to pairs of countries with similar country characteristics
that may aﬀect comparative advantage and bias my estimates if not ac-
counted for. I match countries based on per capita income, ﬁnancial devel-
opment, factor endowments and trade openness.16 By restricting my sample
to matched country pairs, I remove the bias that may exist in my estimates
if these particular country characteristics were ignored.
An alternative strategy is to use IV, but include the same country char-
acteristics interacted with industry characteristics as additional controls in
the second stage. However, unlike IV, matching does not require that I know
exactly how it is that country characteristics aﬀect the pattern of trade in
order to eliminate the bias from the country characteristics. That is, I do
not need to specify the industry characteristics to be interacted with each
country characteristic.17
15In the sample there are 16 socialist, 6 German and 5 Scandinavian legal origin coun-
tries. An additional strategy is to include German and Scandinavian civil law countries
with the French civil law countries. This is not done because there are signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the French, German and Scandinavian systems. Including all civil law
systems together does not alter the results of the paper.
16I continue to use the same measures of income, ﬁnancial development and factor
endowments as before. Trade openness is the log of exports plus imports divided by GDP.
17To see this, assume that the true model is given by (12) and that legal origin is
27To match British common law and French civil law countries I use
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984), which I
perform as follows. Let Lc be an indicator variable that equals one if coun-
try c’s legal origin is British common law and zero if country c’s legal origin
is French civil law. I ﬁrst estimate the following probit model
Pc = Pr{Lc = 1|Xc} = Φ(X′
cβ)
where Φ( ) is the normal CDF and X′
c is the vector of variables used to
match countries. I calculate each country’s predicted propensity score ˆ Pc.
Then, for each British common law country b, I choose the French civil
law country f that minimizes the distance between their propensity scores.
More precisely, for each b, the matched f satisﬁes
f(b) = argmin
f
| ˆ Pb − ˆ Pf| ∀ f ∈ {F}
where F denotes the set of French common law countries. This matching
procedure is often referred to as nearest neighbor matching.
With the sample of matched country pairs, I estimate (13). The results
of this are reported in Table 6. In the ﬁrst column, for comparison I do not
restrict my sample of matched country pairs. I match every British common
law country with every French civil law country and estimate (13), adjusting
the standard errors for clustering. The estimated coeﬃcient of 1.07 is similar
to the estimated eﬀect of 1.22 implied by the IV estimates.18 In columns
2 and 3, I restrict my sample of country pairs to those matched using log
per capita GDP and ﬁnancial development, respectively. In both cases, the
estimated coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, and the mag-
nitude of the coeﬃcients are slightly less than half the baseline estimate of
1.07 from column 1. This suggests that not controlling for diﬀerences in
correlated with Qc, so that my instruments are correlated with the error term if I do
not control for qi(Qc − Qc′). In order for the exclusion restrictions to be satisﬁed, I must
control for qi(Qc−Qc′), which requires correctly identifying and measuring qi. If instead I
compare countries with diﬀerent legal origins and match country pairs by Qc, then among
the pairs of countries that I am comparing Qc ≈ Qc′ and the interaction in (12) is close to
zero. Therefore, I do not have to know qi in order to estimate the eﬀect of judicial quality
on growth.
18The eﬀect from the IV estimates is calculated as follows. When comparing the export
ratio of British and French legal origin countries, Bc = 1, Bc′ = 0, Fc = 0, Fc′ = 1, Gc = 0,
Gc′ = 0, Sc = 0, Sc′ = 0, and the estimated diﬀerence in judicial quality between the two
is: zi(γc − γc′) = .184zi(1 − 0) + .061zi(0 − 1) = .124zi. The second stage coeﬃcient for
zi(γc − γc′) is 9.81. Therefore, the estimated change in relative exports across industries
is: 9.81 × .124zi = 1.22zi.
28Table 6: Comparing matched British common law and French civil law






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Matched by
Not Per-cap. Financial Factor Trade All
matched GDP develop. endow. open. vars.
Contract intensity: zi 1.07 .48 .43 2.01 1.16 .93
(7.02) (2.51) (2.40) (8.10) (4.74) (3.55)
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .70 .57 .65 .54 .68 .68
Number obs. 348,042 5,223 4,898 4,328 3,614 4,138
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors have
been adjusted for clustering within industries. The measure of contract intensity used is zrs1
i .
income and ﬁnancial development between British and French legal origin
countries biases upwards the estimated eﬀect of judicial quality on trade
ﬂows. In addition, it also shows that even controlling for these diﬀerences,
legal origin continues to be an important determinant of comparative ad-
vantage.
In columns 4 and 5, I match countries by factor endowments and trade
openness. In both cases the estimated coeﬃcient remains positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Unlike the results when countries are matched by in-
come and ﬁnancial development, here the estimated magnitudes are larger
than the baseline estimate. In the ﬁnal column, I match country pairs us-
ing all of the variables.19 The estimated coeﬃcient is .93, which is slightly
smaller than the baseline estimate of 1.07, as well as the estimated eﬀect
of 1.22 implied by the IV estimates. This suggests that not accounting for
these country characteristics does result in estimates that are biased up-
ward. In addition, the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant, showing that
British common law countries specialize in goods that rely most heavily on
relationship-speciﬁc investments.
Overall, the matching estimates support the IV estimates. Although
matching yields estimated eﬀects that are slightly smaller than the eﬀects
implied by the IV estimates, the results continue to show that countries with
19I have also tried matching based on diﬀerent subsets of variables. This yields similar
results to what I report here.
29good judicial systems tend to specialize in goods that are contract intense.
5.2 Measurement Error: Vertical Integration and Repeat
Relationships
My analysis to this point has not accounted for the possibility that either
vertical integration or informal forms of contract enforcement, such as repeat
relationships, can be used to help reduce under-investment when contracts
are imperfectly enforced. In this section, I examine how vertical integration
and repeat relationships bias my results. I ﬁnd that my estimates of the
relationship between judicial quality and the pattern of trade are biased
towards zero. I test for this bias by estimating my baseline equation (11)
using a sample of countries for which repeat relationship are least likely to
occur and using a sample of industries for which vertical integration is a
less feasible option. Consistent with the nature of the bias, I ﬁnd that the
estimated eﬀects of judicial quality on the pattern of trade are larger within
these countries and industries.
I ﬁrst consider the bias introduced by vertical integration. My ideal
measure of the contract intensity of industries (call this z∗
i ) would take into
account each industry’s ability to vertically integrate to help alleviate under-
investment. Instead of this ideal measure, I am only able to quantify the
proportion of inputs that are relationship-speciﬁc, zi. Because my measure
does not account for ﬁrms’ ability to vertically integrate, it will tend to
overstate the importance of contracts in each industry. That is, zi −z∗
i > 0.
In addition, this overstatement will likely be greater the higher is zi. This
is because the more important relationship-speciﬁc investments are in an
industry, the greater the beneﬁt to vertical integration (Klein, Crawford
and Alchian, 1978), and all else equal the more likely it is that vertical
integration will occur, causing zi to diﬀer from z∗
i . Following this logic,
assume that measurement error from vertical integration takes the following
form: zi − z∗
i = ρzi + vi, where ρ ∈ (0,1) and vi is i.i.d. drawn from
a normal distribution. By including vi, I also allow for the existence of
random measurement error. Rearranging yields the following relationship










where η ≡ 1 − ρ ∈ (0,1).
If a country has a poorly functioning judicial system, then informal forms
of contract enforcement, such as repeat relationships, may develop as a
substitute for formal contract enforcement. Let γ∗
c denote my ideal measure
30of the contracting environment that accounts for repeat relationships and γc
my observed measure. Because γc does not account for the ability of repeat
relationships to partially substitute for formal contract enforcement, it will
tend to understate the quality of the contracting environment: γ∗
c −γc > 0.
In addition, because repeat relationships develop as a substitute for formal
contract enforcement, the diﬀerence between γ∗
c and γc is likely larger the
worse is the quality of the judicial system. Based on this logic, I assume
that measurement error takes the following form: γ∗
c − γc = ψ(1 − γc) +wc,
where ψ ∈ (0,1) and wc is i.i.d. drawn from a normal distribution. Again, I












where φ ≡ 1 − ψ ∈ (0,1).
Expressing all variables as deviations from means, the true relationship
between trade ﬂows, the contracting environment and contract intensity is
given by
lnxic − lnxic′ = β z∗
i (γ∗
c − γ∗
c′) + εicc′ (16)
and the OLS estimate of β is
ˆ β =
P




i (γc − γc′)2 (17)
Substituting (14), (15) and (16) into (17) and taking the probability limit
of ˆ β gives















Two sources of measurement error are apparent. One is attenuation
bias from classic errors-in-variables. This is given by the expression inside
the brackets, where the denominator is larger than the numerator. There
is also a second bias that exists because of vertical integration and repeat
relationships. To see this, assume that classical measurement error is absent
with σ2
w = σ2
v = 0. Then, plim ˆ β = β ηφ. Because η and φ are both between
zero and one, the estimate of β is still biased towards zero.
Because of the two sources of measurement error, both of which bias OLS
estimates towards zero, the OLS estimates reported may be a lower bound.
The true relationship between contract enforcement and the pattern of trade








Judicial quality interaction: zi(γc − γc′) .18 .11 .20
(21.9) (11.7) (22.6)








Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
R
2 .82 .82 .82
Number obs. 22,353 22,353 22,353
Notes: Beta coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets. The measure of
contract intensity used is zrs1
i .
may be larger than the estimates suggest. I explore this possibility by test-
ing whether the estimated relationship between judicial quality and trade
ﬂows is stronger within industries where vertical integration is most diﬃ-
cult and most costly, and among countries where informal forms of contract
enforcement are least likely to arise. As an indicator of the diﬃculty of ver-
tical integration, I use the number of inputs used in the production process,
calculated using the 1997 United States I-O Use Table. This assumes that
vertical integration is more diﬃcult in industries that requires many diﬀer-
ent inputs. For ﬁrms that use a small number of inputs, producing all inputs
in-house is more feasible and less costly. I test whether the relationship be-
tween the contracting environment and trade ﬂows is stronger in industries
for which vertical integration is more diﬃcult by constructing an indicator
variable I
ni>n
i that equals one if the number of inputs used in industry i is
greater than the average number of inputs used in each industry, which is
75. I interact the indicator variable with zi(γc −γc′) and include this in my
baseline equation (11).
The estimation results are summarized in Table 7. Column 1 reproduces
the baseline estimate for comparison. Column 2 includes the interaction
term, which is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that the
estimated relationship between the contracting environment and trade ﬂows
is stronger in industries that require many inputs. The estimated coeﬃcient
32is .21 within industries requiring more inputs than average and .11 within
industries requiring less inputs than average. This can be contrasted to the
estimated coeﬃcient for the sample as a whole reported in column 1, which is
.18. These results support my calculations of the bias introduced by vertical
integration. I ﬁnd a stronger relationship between contract enforcement and
trade ﬂows in industries for which vertical integration is less likely to be a
feasible alternative.
If countries with the worst judicial systems are the most likely to de-
velop repeat relationships, then because of the bias introduced by repeat
relationships, the estimated relationship between judicial quality and trade
ﬂows will be strongest among the countries with the best judicial systems.
To test for this, I construct an indicator variable I
γc′>γ
c that equals one if
the measured rule of law in country c′ is greater than the average, which
is .51. I interact this with zi(γc − γc′) and include this interaction in my
baseline estimate. The results, reported in column 3, show that the es-
timated relationship between judicial quality and trade ﬂows is strongest
among countries with the best judicial systems. The estimated coeﬃcient
for these countries is .25, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the estimate of
.18 for the sample as a whole. Again, these results are consistent with my
calculations of the bias introduced from repeat relationships.
Overall, the results of this section suggest that the existence of repeat re-
lationships and vertical integration bias OLS estimates towards zero. There-
fore, my baseline estimates may represent a lower bound of the eﬀect of
contract enforcement on trade ﬂows.
5.3 Sensitivity and Robustness
5.3.1 Using Alternative Measures of Judicial Quality and Con-
tract Intensity
The ﬁrst sensitivity check that I perform tests the robustness of my results to
alternative measures of γc and zi. I re-estimate (11) using four alternative
measures of the contracting environment and both measures of contract
intensity, zrs1
i and zrs2
i . The results are reported in Table 8. Each entry of
the table reports the estimated coeﬃcient and t-statistic for the interaction
term zi(γc − γc′) when diﬀerent measures of γc and zi are used. Columns
1 and 2 report the estimation results when I estimate (11) without capital
and skill endowment interactions and columns 3 and 4 report the estimation
results with capital and skill interactions. In columns 1 and 3, I use zrs1
i
as the measure of contract intensity, and in columns 2 and 4, I use zrs2
i .
33Each row of the table reports the results when diﬀerent measures of contract
Table 8: Alternative measures of judicial quality and contract intensity.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Without factor With factor
Measure of endowment controls endowment controls









Rule of law .18 .27 .21 .25
(21.9) (18.6) (17.7) (12.3)
Legal quality .21 .25 .23 .23
(22.3) (15.6) (19.2) (10.7)
Number of procedures .14 .18 .17 .17
(18.5) (12.5) (16.1) (8.98)
Oﬃcial costs .11 .23 .11 .18
(12.7) (14.4) (9.41) (8.43)
Time .06 .05 .05 .04
(8.00) (4.05) (5.22) (2.41)
Notes: Each entry of the table reports the beta coeﬃcient and t-statistic for
zi(γc − γc′). Each regression also includes country pair and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Each regression has the following number of observations (with and without factor
endowment controls): 18,839 and 10,641 when ‘legal quality’ is used; 19,232 and
10,601 when ‘number of procedures’ is used; 18,636 and 10,104 when ‘oﬃcial costs’ is
used; and 18,636 and 10,104 when ‘time’ is used.
enforcement are used. In the ﬁrst row, for comparison I report the estimation
results when the rule of law is used as my measure of γc. The second row
reports the results when I use a subjective measure of legal quality in 1995
from Gwartney and Lawson (2003). The ﬁnal three rows report results when
I use three alternative measures of the quality of the legal system from the
World Bank’s Doing Business Database. In cooperation with Lex Mundi
member law ﬁrms across the world, Djankov et al. (2003) have documented
the exact procedures used by courts and litigants to evict a tenant for non-
payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. Using this information, the
World Bank has constructed three variables that can be used as measures
of the quality of the judicial system and its ability to enforce contracts:
the number of procedures involved, the oﬃcial costs, and the total time













Judicial quality interaction: .18 .27
zi(γc − γc′) (21.9) (18.6)




Judicial quality interaction: .16 .28
zi(γc − γc′) (22.9) (22.5)




Judicial quality interaction: .14 .27
zi(γc − γc′) (10.2) (12.2)




Judicial quality interaction: .20 .33
zi(γc − γc′) (9.80) (7.90)
Number obs. 6,620 6,620
R
2 .68 .68
Notes: Beta coeﬃcients are reported, with t-statistics in brackets. The
measure of contract intensity used is zrs1
i . Each regression includes
industry and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
required. I scale each variable so that a higher number indicates a better
judicial system. As Table 8 shows, no matter which measures of γc and zi
are used, the estimated coeﬃcient of zi(γc −γc′) is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant.
5.3.2 Sensitivity to Alternative Samples and Inﬂuential Obser-
vations
Next, I test the sensitivity of my results to alternative samples and to the re-
moval of inﬂuential observations. The results are summarized in Table 9. In
the top panel of the table, I report the baseline estimates for comparison. In
the second panel, I omit observations with studentized residuals greater than
352.0 and re-estimate (11).20 As shown, the results are robust to the removal
of outlying observations. Next, I restrict my sample to countries that had
joined the OECD by 1997. This serves as a check of whether the results are
being driven by broad diﬀerences between developing and developed coun-
tries or whether the importance of judicial quality can also be seen among
the group of most developed countries. In addition, because data from these
countries are of good quality, I am also testing the sensitivity of my results
to the omission of countries with lower quality data. As shown in the third
panel, the results continue to hold when the equation is estimated using only
OECD countries. As a ﬁnal sensitivity check, I test whether my ﬁndings are
robust to the time period being considered by re-estimating (11) using data
from 1963.21 The trade data are from the UN’s Comtrade database. As a
measure of contract enforcement I use a subjective measure of each coun-
try’s legal quality in 1970 from Gwartney and Lawson (2003).22 Using the
1963 U.S. I-O tables and Rauch’s (1999) data, I construct measures of zrs1
i
and zrs2
i for 1963. In the end, my 1963 sample includes 42 countries and
178 industries. As shown in the last panel of the table, the 1963 estimates
support the ﬁndings for 1997. The estimated coeﬃcients for the judicial
quality interaction remain positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In addition,
they are approximately the same magnitudes as the 1997 coeﬃcients.
5.3.3 Robustness to the use of United States Input-Output Ta-
bles
Because highly disaggregated I-O tables do not exist for all countries, when
constructing my measures of zi, I must use the U.S. I-O table for all coun-
tries, implicitly assuming that each country’s intermediate input use is the
same as in the United States. In this section, I test the sensitivity of my
results to this assumption. I do this as follows. For 50 of the 146 countries
20An observations studentized residual is calculated from a regression with the obser-
vation in question excluded. This methodology allows one to recognize an outlier that
strongly inﬂuences the estimated regression line, causing the observation to have a small
residual. See Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980).
21I choose to report 1963 estimates because this is the earliest year for which data are
available. I have also estimated the equations using data from 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987
and 1992, and the results are robust to each of these alternative samples. Unfortunately,
one is unable to create a panel data set because the industry classiﬁcation of the trade
data and the production data are not consistent over time.
22I use this measure because Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) rule of law measure is not available
for years before 1996 and Djankov et al.’s (2003) variables are not available for years prior
to 2003. I have also used real per capita GDP in 1963 as a rough proxy for judicial quality.
This produces estimates that are very similar to what I report here.
36Table 10: Robustness to the reliance on U.S. I-O tables for all countries.






Beta coef t-stat R
2 Obs Countries
All countries with GTAP I-O tables .22 18.1 .79 9,873 50
Countries omitted if ˆ ρ < .5 .24 17.7 .78 8,460 43
Countries omitted if ˆ ρ < .6 .25 17.2 .78 7,391 38
Countries omitted if ˆ ρ < .7 .25 15.6 .78 6,343 32
Countries omitted if ˆ ρ < .8 .20 9.87 .73 4,984 24
Countries omitted if ˆ ρ < .9 .16 4.58 .66 2,403 12
Notes: Each regression includes industry and country pair ﬁxed eﬀects. The measure of
contract intensity used is zrs1
i .
in my sample I-O tables for 1997 disaggregated into 57 sectors are avail-
able from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Data Base. Using the
GTAP tables, I construct measures of the similarity of each country’s I-O
table to the U.S. I-O table. To construct a measure of similarity to the U.S.
I-O table, I follow Elmslie and Milberg (1992). I take the vector of ﬁnal
goods produced in the U.S. in 1997 (also from the GTAP Data Base) and,
using the U.S. GTAP I-O table, I calculate the amount of each intermediate
input that is needed to produced this output vector. For every other country
for which a GTAP I-O table exists, I use the country’s I-O table to calculate
the amount of each intermediate input that is needed to produce the same
output vector. I then compare each country’s input vector with the U.S.
input vector by calculating the pair wise correlation coeﬃcient of the two
vectors. I then re-estimate my baseline equation after restricting the sample
to include only countries with I-O tables that are most similar to the U.S.
I-O table.
The results of this procedure are reported in Table 10. Each row reports
the results from one regression. In the ﬁrst row, I restrict my sample to
only include the 50 countries that have GTAP I-O tables. In the subsequent
rows, I exclude countries with I-O tables that are dissimilar to the U.S. I-O
table. I ﬁrst omit countries with a correlation coeﬃcient less than .5, then
.6, and so forth. As shown, the results remain robust to the omission of
countries that have input-output structures diﬀerent from the U.S. In every
subsample, the estimated coeﬃcient remains positive, statistically signiﬁcant
and approximately the same magnitude as the estimate of .18 for the full
sample.
376 Conclusions
I have tested whether a country’s contracting environment is source of com-
parative advantage. I have found that countries with good contract enforce-
ment specialize in industries where relationship-speciﬁc investments are im-
portant. My estimates suggest that contract enforcement explains more of
the variation in trade ﬂows than do endowments of capital or skilled labor.
To correct for the possibility of endogeneity and omitted variables bias, I
pursued a number of strategies. First, I controlled for a number of alterna-
tive determinants of comparative advantage. Second, I used instrumental
variables to instrument for judicial quality, which is potentially endogenous
to trade ﬂows. As instruments I used each country’s legal origin. Third, I
used propensity score matching to compare matched British common law
and French civil law countries. I matched countries by important country
characteristics that may aﬀect trade ﬂows through channels other than con-
tract enforcement. I found that the OLS results remain robust to these
corrections. Overall, the results suggest that a nation’s ability to enforce
contracts is an important determinant of comparative advantage and the
pattern of trade.
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A Proofs
Lemma. The ratio c(ps,γ,z)/c(ps′
,γ′,z) is decreasing in z.





















Because a(z) is increasing in z, c(ps,γ,z)/c(ps′
,γ′,z) is decreasing in z.
Proposition. For any two countries with γ  = γ′ an equilibrium with trade
exists and is unique.
Proof. Because consumers’ preferences are Cobb-Douglas, the constant ex-
penditure share b(z) is given by
b(z) =
P(z)C(z)
Y + Y ′ > 0
where P(z) is the price of good z, C(z) is the consumption of good z by
both countries, and Y and Y ′ are the aggregate incomes in each country.
The fraction of total income spent on goods produced by the country with
43the better judiciary is
R 1
˜ z b(z)dz and the fraction spent on goods from the
country with the poor judiciary is
R ˜ z
0 b(z)dz.
Balanced trade requires that the amount spent by each country on the







Total income is given by Y = f(q∗(γ))pcLc + psLs. Using (8), this can
be rewritten as Y = ps(Lc + Ls) = psL, where L is the country’s total
endowment of labor. Analogously, income for the country with the poor
judicial system is given by Y ′ = ps′
L′. Substituting the expressions for Y












B(˜ z;L′/L) is continuous and decreasing in z. We have B(1;L′/L) = 0, and
B(˜ z;L′/L) → ∞ as ˜ z → 0.
Equal costs of producing good ˜ z requires c(ps,γ, ˜ z) = c(ps′




1 + a(˜ z)/f(q∗(γ′))
1 + a(˜ z)/f(q∗(γ))
≡ C(˜ z)
From the lemma, it follows that C(˜ z) is increasing in ˜ z, and because a(˜ z) is










Figure 3: Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The determination of equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3. The exis-
tence and uniqueness of equilibrium follows from C(˜ z) being increasing and
44continuous in ˜ z, and from B(˜ z;L′/L) being continuous and decreasing in ˜ z,
ranging from zero to inﬁnity.
B N Country Equilibrium
Consider the general case with N countries. I order these countries from 1
to N in increasing order of γ, such that γ1 < γ2 < ... < γN−1 < γN.

















where ˜ zi−1 and ˜ zi are the lower and upper cut-oﬀs for country i, i.e. country
i produces goods z ∈ [˜ zi−1, ˜ zi].
These conditions give N−1 independent equations. The balance of trade
condition for the Nth country follows from the balance of trade condition
of the other N −1 countries. In addition, N −1 equal cost conditions must






1 + a(˜ zi)/f(q∗(γi))
1 + a(˜ zi)/f(q∗(γi+1))
The balanced trade and equal cost conditions for each country provide
2N−2 equations. Choosing any country’s input price as the num´ eraire equal
to one results in an additional equation so that there are 2N − 1 equations
in total. There are 2N − 1 unknowns: N − 1 cut-oﬀs, ˜ z1,..., ˜ zN−1, and N





Exports (xic): The total value (in thousands of U.S. dollars) of exports
by country c in industry i to all other countries in 1997. Source: World
Trade Flows Database (Feenstra, 2000). The original data are classiﬁed by
the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system. I concord the data to the BEA’s 1997 I-O
classiﬁcation system, by ﬁrst using the concordance from SITC to HS10, and
then the concordance from HS10 to the I-O classiﬁcation. The ﬁrst concor-
dance is from the NBER Trade Database, Disk 1. The second concordance
45is from the BEA. I use the number of HS10 categories linking each SITC
and BEA category as an indicator of which BEA category to choose when
an SITC category maps into multiple BEA categories. Data from 1963 are
from the UN’s Comtrade database. The original data are classiﬁed by the
4-digit SITC Rev. 1 system. I concord the trade data to BEA’s 1963 I-O
classiﬁcation using a concordance from SITC Rev. 1 to SIC72, which the
I-O system is based on. The concordance is from Feenstra (1996).
Log real per capita GDP (yc): The natural log of real GDP per capita
in 1997. I use ‘rgdpch’ from the Penn World Tables (PWT) Mark 6.1 data
set. Income data from Maddison (2001) are used for countries without 1997
PWT income data. I link the two measures based on the following cross
country regression: rgdpch1997 = 288.1184 + 1.145986maddison1997. For
the regression n = 100, R2 = .9767, the t-statistic for β0 is 1.66, and the
t-statistic for β1 is 64.13.
Capital endowment (Kc): The natural log of the average capital stock
per worker in 1992. Source: Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002).
Human capital endowment (Hc): The natural log of the fraction of
workers that completed high school to those that did not complete high
school in 1992. Source: Antweiler and Treﬂer (2002).
Rule of law (γc): The rule of law in 1997/1998. The variable, which
ranges from 0 to 1, measures the extent to which agents have conﬁdence
in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the inci-
dence of crime, the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
enforceability of contracts. A higher number indicates a better rule of law.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2003).
Legal quality: A measure of the “legal structure and the security of prop-
erty rights”. The measure is an index from 1 to 10, which is comprised of
ﬁve component indices also from 1 to 10. The component indices are from
two sources: the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR). The component indices measure: judicial
independence (GCR), impartial courts (GCR), protection of intellectual
property (GCR), military inﬂuence in the rule of law and political process
(ICRG), and the integrity of the legal system (ICRG). Source: Gwartney
and Lawson (2003).
Number of Procedures: The total number of procedures mandated by
law or court regulation that demand interaction between the parties or
between them and the judge (or administrator) or court oﬃcer. Because
46more procedures are associated with a lower judicial quality, I use 60 minus
the total number of procedures as my measure. Therefore, a higher num-
ber indicates less necessary procedures and a more eﬃcient judicial system.
The measure ranges from 2 to 49. Source: World Bank’s Doing Business
Database. See Djankov et al. (2003).
Oﬃcial costs: The sum of attorney fees and court fees during the litigation
process, divided by the country’s income per capita. The measure that I use
is 6 minus the log of total oﬃcial costs. Therefore, a higher number indicates
lower costs of litigation and a better legal system. The measure ranges from
.45 to 4.56. Source: World Bank’s Doing Business Database. See Djankov
et al. (2003).
Time: The total estimated time of the full legal procedure in calendar days.
It equals the total time until completion of service of process, duration
of trial, and duration of enforcement. I use 1,500 minus the total time.
Therefore, a higher number indicates a shorter duration and a better legal
system. The measure ranges from 41 to 1,473. Source: World Bank’s Doing
Business Database. See Djankov et al. (2003).
Legal origin: The legal origin of each country. Countries are classiﬁed
as either: German, Scandinavian, British, French or Socialist. Source: La
Porta et al. (1999).
Financial development (crc): The natural log of private credit by de-
posit money banks to GDP in 1997. Source: Financial Structure and Eco-
nomic Development Database. See Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (1999).
Trade openness: The natural log of aggregate exports plus imports divided
by aggregate GDP. Source: Feenstra (2000) and PWT 6.1.
C.2 Industry Data
Contract intensity (zi): This measures the importance of relationship-
speciﬁc investments in each industry. Source: author’s calculations. See the
paper for a complete description of the measures that are constructed.
Capital intensity (ki): Capital stock, calculated as the total real capital
stock in industry i (in millions of dollars), divided by the value added (in
millions of dollars) in industry i for the United States in 1996. Source:
Bartelsman and Gray (1996). The original data are classiﬁed according to
the SIC87 system. This is converted to the I-O classiﬁcation by using the
concordance from SIC87 to HS10, and then HS10 to the I-O classiﬁcation.
47Both concordances are provided by the BEA.
Skill intensity (hi): The ratio of non-production worker wages to total
wages in industry i in the United States in 1996. Source: Bartelsman and
Gray (1996).
Value added (vai): Total value added divided by the total value of ship-
ments in industry i in 1997.
Intra-industry trade (iiti): The amount of intra-industry trade in each
industry. I use the Grubel-Lloyd index for the United States in 1997. The
index is equal to 1 −
|xi−mi|
xi+mi , where xi and mi are exports and imports in
industry i.
TFP growth (∆tfpi): Average growth rate in TFP in the United States
between 1977 and 1997 in industry i. Source: Bartelsman and Gray (1996).
1 minus Herﬁndahl index (1 − HI i): The Herﬁndahl index for industry
i is given by
P
j θ2
ij, where θij is the share of input j used in the production
of ﬁnal good i. The measure was constructed using the 1997 United States
I-O Use Table.
48Table 11: Countries in the sample, ordered by rule of law.
Rule Rule Rule
Country of law Country of law Country of law
Switzerland .972 Thailand .580 Venezuela .375
Singapore .948 Trin. & Tobago .577 Ecuador .375
Norway .943 Argentina .548 Maldives .370
New Zealand .935 India .543 Kiribati .369
Austria .921 South Africa .543 Solomon Islands .369
Finland .912 Turkey .538 Colombia .367
U.K. .909 Egypt .534 Yemen .365
Netherlands .904 Lebanon .532 Niger .360
Australia .898 Guyana .513 Guatemala .359
Denmark .897 Belize .507 Pakistan .357
Canada .896 Mongolia .505 Bangladesh .356
Sweden .890 Zimbabwe .501 Sierra Leone .356
Germany .881 Panama .495 Cambodia .354
Iceland .880 Philippines .492 Suriname .353
Ireland .863 Ghana .488 Russia .345
U.S.A. .854 Bhutan .486 Paraguay .344
Hong Kong .846 Brazil .482 Algeria .342
Japan .844 Sri Lanka .479 Vietnam .339
France .789 Uganda .477 Nicaragua .337
Qatar .779 El Salvador .461 Togo .335
Spain .770 Bulgaria .457 Burundi .330
Portugal .761 China .456 Centr. Afr. Rep. .326
Belgium .758 Ethiopia .453 Guinea .322
Oman .755 Jamaica .452 Yugoslavia .317
U.A.E. .754 Romania .451 Cameroon .316
Chile .752 Nepal .450 Albania .304
Taiwan .734 Syria .449 Comoros .306
Kuwait .731 Senegal .447 Indonesia .305
Israel .717 Tanzania .444 Chad .304
Italy .714 Gambia .443 Haiti .302
Bahrain .706 Papua New Guin. .436 Madagascar .298
Bahamas .698 Djibouti .435 Mozambique .297
Mauritius .692 Bolivia .434 Kenya .296
Brunei Dar. .683 St. Kitts .433 Myanmar .288
Saudi Arabia .679 Seychelles .433 Laos .286
Costa Rica .676 Zambia .432 Libya .278
Cyprus .675 Mexico .425 Afghanistan .274
South Korea .664 Benin .424 Rwanda .259
Malaysia .663 Fiji .420 North Korea .258
Hungary .656 Burkina Faso .415 Congo .254
Malta .638 Peru .412 Guinea-Bissau .252
Greece .633 Gabon .404 Nigeria .240
Czech Rep. .623 Mauritania .403 Angola .211
Jordan .620 Iran .402 Iraq .164
Poland .615 Cuba .400 Equatorial Guin. .162
Barbados .610 Malawi .397 Liberia .141
Morocco .607 Ivory Coast .396 Somalia .139
Uruguay .599 Mali .386 Zaire .106
Tunisia .588 Honduras .376
Notes: The rule of law variables has been rounded from six digits to three digits.
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